

# “The battle of Chancellorsville was lost right there:”

## **McLaws versus Sykes on the Orange Turnpike May 1, 1863**

By Frank A. O’Reilly

**U**nion cavalymen crept through the underbrush, their footfalls muffled by rain and matted leaves. Confederate pickets peered into the forest, waiting for something to happen. Suddenly, Federals surged out of the bushes. A quick exchange of fire rent the air, and then, “utter silence.” Confederate Brigadier General William Mahone “was puzzled to understand this,” and sent an orderly to investigate. The mounted soldier ventured into the woods without spotting friend or foe. Upon returning to Mahone, the general “made some impatient exclamation” that caught the ear of Colonel Allen Parham, of the 41<sup>st</sup> Virginia Infantry. The colonel dashed into the woods to reevaluate the picket line. He had barely entered the trees when he was greeted with a volley from the Federal cavalry. The colonel miraculously avoided being hit, but his horse bolted, almost leaving the rider behind. At the same time, a low tree limb swept Parham’s kepi from his head. Galloping up to General Mahone, Parham unleashed a slew of curses on “the \_\_\_\_\_ Yankees.” The entire picket line north of the Chancellorsville crossroads had been ambushed. Two officers and twenty-three men had been nabbed by the stealthy Northerners.<sup>1</sup>

Mahone’s Virginia brigade quickly evacuated the area around the Chancellorsville tavern, and retreated east, down the Orange Turnpike toward Fredericksburg. The 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia Infantry formed a double line of skirmishers to cover the withdrawal. As the Southerners slipped away, Union soldiers filled the clearing around the tavern. Some of the Northerners sniffed at their new conquest. Perplexed by the grandiose name of Chancellorsville, one New Yorker wrote sarcastically: “It is a town with one large brick house and two small ones of wood.” Another Unionist wrote in darker tones: “Chancellorsville consists of one large brick house in the \_\_\_\_\_ most god forsaken wilderness any human ever saw.” Union soldiers may have voiced skepticism, but their commander, Major General Joseph Hooker, soon hailed this crossroads as the essential ingredient to defeating the Rebel forces under General


Robert E. Lee, and his able subordinate, Lieutenant General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. Hooker had stolen a march on the normally vigilant Confederates and his Union forces stood both in front of and behind Lee’s army. Hooker’s troops, 125,000 strong, formed a vice that threatened to crush the Southern chieftain’s much smaller force of 50,000. The Federal commander congratulated his men on the last night of April 1863—tomorrow would begin the systematic destruction of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, Federal cavalry, under Colonel Thomas C. Devin, prodded Mahone’s retreat down the Orange Turnpike. A mile east of Chancellorsville, the woods grudgingly gave way to a small clearing. Union horsemen, members of the 8<sup>th</sup> Pennsylvania Cavalry, took advantage of the opening to charge the Virginia foot soldiers. Charles E. DeNoon, of the 41<sup>st</sup> Virginia, admitted: “The enemy followed closely, frequent skirmishing with the enemy’s cavalry.” Northerners drove the Rebels from a shallow valley, a mile wide, formed by a meandering stream known as Mott’s Run. Mahone’s main force slipped away to a pronounced ridge farther east, capped by Zoan Church, a wood frame Baptist meeting house. The 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia rearguard continued to battle the annoying cavalymen on the slopes above Mott’s Run, reluctantly giving ground under increasing pressure. The Federal commander, Colonel Devin, admitted that, “the enemy’s pickets...retired very slowly.” He took their obstinacy as a sign that the Confederates “were confident of support.” Reaching the eastern end of the Mott’s Run valley, Devin ordered Major Peter Keenan, of the 8<sup>th</sup> Pennsylvania Cavalry, to dismount a part of his command and deploy on both sides of the Turnpike. Venturing closer to the Zoan Church ridge, the Yankees found the Confederates in force. “The enemy opened a heavy fire on them,” reported Devin, “and compelled them to withdraw.” The cavalry could not budge the Southerners from Zoan Church on April 30. The job would have to wait for infantry support, which was supposed to arrive the next day.<sup>3</sup>

Anticipating reinforcements on May 1, Devin pulled back his cavalry for the night. They bivouacked west of Mott’s Run, while a portion of the 8<sup>th</sup> Pennsylvania Cavalry clung to the eastern top of the valley. Major Keenan strung pickets across the road in a clearing by the Joseph Alsop house. The picket reserve formed a couple of hundred yards behind them, in the yard of the Ann Lewis farm. The Federals knew their work would be stiffer in the morning, but they had no idea how much.<sup>4</sup>

Just as Devin suspected, Mahone’s Confederates had been reinforced. Elements of Major General Richard H. Anderson’s division congregated on the Zoan Church ridge. Brigadier General Carnot Posey’s Mississippi brigade, and Ambrose R. Wright’s Georgia troops extended

Mahone's left, south of the Turnpike. Brigadier General Wright straddled another significant east-west thoroughfare, the Orange Plank Road. Lee had counseled Richard Anderson to protect the high ground at Zoan Church at all costs. Anderson ordered his division to fortify the ridge against attack and the resulting earthworks were among the very first hasty field fortifications erected during the Civil War. Lee also rushed more reinforcements to support Anderson's thin line. Major General Lafayette McLaws marched his division toward Zoan Church, although the bulk of his forces would not arrive until morning. Filling the roads behind them would be the vaunted legions of Stonewall Jackson. Lee had determined that the Union forces around Fredericksburg posed little threat to his army—



*Confederate Major General  
Lafayette McLaws*

the real danger lay to the west, around Chancellorsville. The Confederate commander bled troops away from the hills guarding Fredericksburg so he could meet Hooker head-on. Lee intended to challenge an enemy almost two and a half times larger than his available strength. The general instructed McLaws to prepare his men for a monumental confrontation: "Let them know that it is a stern reality now, it must be Victory or Death, for defeat would be ruinous." In that light, Anderson's men kept vigil throughout the night. The soldiers "expected to be attacked at day light and had to be on the alert."<sup>5</sup>

The Confederates strengthened their breastworks throughout the night, but in the morning there was no Federal assault. The Union cavalry appeared to have gone, except for a few scattered pickets. At 8:00 a.m., on May 1, Stonewall Jackson arrived to take command of the situation. He also recognized the importance of the Zoan Church ridge, but decided the best way to protect it would be to attack Hooker's Federals before the main Union force cleared the Wilderness and brought their much greater strength to bear. Jackson accordingly told Anderson to stop fortifying and advance. An impressionable Virginia staff officer, jotted in his memorandum book: "That means we are not to wait for Hooker." Anderson's division filled the Plank Road. Stonewall would personally lead it west, because he thought the area south of the Turnpike promised more room to maneuver. Lafayette McLaws, with Mahone's Brigade leading, would advance up the Turnpike, looking to fix the Federals in place so Jackson could hammer their flank.<sup>6</sup>

Joseph Hooker, in the mean time, had reinforced his Chancellorsville force with two more corps and prepared to close the trap on Lee's army

at Fredericksburg. He predicted that Lee must either come out from his imposing river defenses, and fight at a grave disadvantage, or he must “ingloriously fly” before the closing vice of Union troops. Hooker set out on May 1, 1863 to complete his victory. Union soldiers marched



*Union Major General  
George Sykes*

east from Chancellorsville, using the Orange Turnpike, the Orange Plank Road, and the River Road. All three thoroughfares bulged apart, as they coursed across Spotsylvania County, before converging on Fredericksburg and Lee’s rear. The grand advance began at midmorning. Union Major General George Gordon Meade’s Fifth Corps started first, divided into two columns. Meade led two divisions — Charles Griffin’s and Andrew A. Humphreys’ — onto the River Road. His third division, under Major General George “Tardy George” Sykes marched directly east on the Turnpike. Once the Fifth Corps cleared the Chancellorsville intersection, Major General Henry W. Slocum’s Twelfth Corps filed slowly onto the Plank Road. Hooker’s immediate objec-


tive was for “Sykes’ division...to advance on the old Richmond turnpike until after crossing Mott’s Run, when he was to move to the left, deploy, and open communications with Griffin on his left and Slocum on his right.” Once contact had been established, and “all were in position,” the Union troops were “to advance simultaneously against the enemy.” By late morning, Union and Confederate forces were headed straight for each other on the Orange Turnpike and the Old Plank Road.<sup>7</sup>

Stonewall Jackson’s Confederates had started west toward the Wilderness at 11:00 a.m. General Carnot Posey led Jackson’s troops on the Plank Road, while General William Mahone preceded McLaws on the Turnpike. Mahone’s skirmishers scattered ahead of the column of march and flared across the fields and forest of the Florence McCarty, or McCarthy, farm. Major William H. Stewart, of the 61<sup>st</sup> Virginia, wrote that, “the soldiers...moved forward in brilliant style.” With an artilleryman’s eye for terrain, Confederate Captain David Gregg McIntosh described the area west of Zoan Church during a post-war visit: “[A] short distance beyond on rising ground, we came upon a wide plateau with open country on both sides of the road, and stretching to the north for more than a mile.” McIntosh marveled at the openness of the ground, concluding that it was “admirably adapted for the deployment of large bodies of men and for the use of artillery.” Since the Wilderness extended to the area of Zoan Church, the open ground that McIntosh admired would have been centered on a cluster of farms beside the Turn-

pike—with the names Alsop, Leitch, Lewis, and Reuben McGee. The next appreciable clearing was Chancellorsville.<sup>8</sup>

William Mahone told Lieutenant Colonel Everard M. Feild, of the 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia Infantry, to “drive in the Yankee skirmishers” from the Joseph Alsop house. The general instructed: “I wish you to drive them...quickly, and until you find the enemy’s line of battle.” And then he darkly confided: “I expect you and your whole regiment will be captured, but we have a trap set for them, and we will re-capture you.” Jackson’s movement on the Plank Road undoubtedly was the “trap” Mahone alluded to, as it would turn the flank of any Union force on the Turnpike. “About 11:15,” the Confederates encountered the 8<sup>th</sup> Pennsylvania Cavalry “in front of Mott’s Run.” The units collided a half mile from Zoan Church.<sup>9</sup>

Captain Charles I. Wickersham, 8<sup>th</sup> Pennsylvania Cavalry, lounged in the yard of Lewis’ farm when Ann Lewis warned him that the Confederates were advancing. Wickersham recalled how “a woman, who lived in a small two-story house a few yards from where I had located my re-



*Confederates under General McLaws clear Union cavalry.*

serve, came out in a very excited manner, and called to me to go up stairs and look at the rebels." The captain viewed the approaching Southerners from an upstairs window and then ordered the picket reserve to mount. "I rode rapidly out to my picket line," Wickersham related, "which had just begun exchanging shots with the enemy." He told the sergeant in charge of the post at the Alsop house to "stay there as long as he could and then fall back at a gallop." The captain dashed back to the picket reserve at the Lewis farm. He ordered his troopers to dismount again. He placed them "behind a crude brush fence, which formed an excellent cover." Mrs. Lewis wisely took shelter in her cellar.<sup>10</sup>

Colonel Feild sent a company of the 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia to seize the Union position at the Alsop house. The commander of the regiment reported: "I directed Captain [Robert R.] Banks, with his company, to advance ahead of the artillery and drive the pickets from the house." Banks failed in his first try. "He soon reported that they were too strong for him," recalled Feild, "and asked for re-enforcements." The colonel, "remembering Mahone's orders about haste," deployed the whole regiment, after which the Southerners easily outgunned the Yankee outpost. "The Federal pickets, seeing that they were about to be flanked on both sides, quickly fell back on their skirmish line on the hill," the hill being situated between Ann Lewis' house and John B. Leitch's.<sup>11</sup>

Confederates surged forward and attacked the Union picket reserve. Captain Wickersham reported: "The enemy soon came within easy carbine range" of his "crude brush fence," when he "commenced firing to which they promptly replied and a lively skirmish was soon in progress." Rebels lapped around the Union flanks, and Wickersham's troopers again started to give ground. Federal reinforcements arrived from the other side of Mott's Run at that critical moment. Colonel Thomas Devin had advanced the 8<sup>th</sup> Pennsylvania Cavalry in strength, to brace their pickets, as soon as Wickersham began to falter. The mounted cavalrymen launched "several charges" to keep the Rebels at bay. Confederate LeRoy S. Edwards testified: "We got to a top of [a] hill, and then the Yanks were some 200 yards off on another elevation deployed, as we were across the road facing us, they would fire at us, and then make their horses move about to keep us from aiming accurately." The Federal cavalry successfully slowed Mahone's progress, but failed to stop it. One of Mahone's men wrote: "The enemy fights stubbornly, but gives way sullenly." Another recounted: "[W]e drove them back but I must say they were stubborn fellows to deal with." LeRoy Edwards had to take shelter "in a way of a house and barn" during one of these mounted counterstrokes. Given his proximity to the ridge, or "top of [a] hill," he appears to have hidden in the John B. Leitch house.<sup>12</sup>


The Confederates ultimately drove the Union cavalry back across

Mott's Run. They seized the high ground overlooking the creek at Reuben McGee's farm and halted. McLaws' gray clad soldiers had advanced a mile from Zoan Church. Mahone's Virginia brigade had already met the Yankee cavalry there the night before and prepared to defend the ground again. Captain John Wallace wrote, rather parochially: "[W]e...had our first fight. This battle is called 'McCarthy's.'" But their claim of victory was premature.<sup>13</sup>

A Virginia major scanned the horizon, and reported: "The sun has now opened in his full glory. Bright bayonets are glittering and gleaming, the lumbering of unlimbering artillery" could be seen on the hills west of Mott's Run. The major thought that they presented "reliable oracles of the bloody work at hand." Federal infantry, under Major General Sykes, had advanced to a ridge overlooking Mott's Run just as the Union cavalry withdrew across the stream. As the arriving Union division reached the Absalom McGee and Newton farms, it spotted the retreating 8<sup>th</sup> Pennsylvania Cavalry. Sykes recounted that he "found some cavalry engaged with the enemy's skirmishers. The former were giving ground, and, by their behavior, giving confidence to the enemy." The Union general deployed his division of three brigades into three lines. Colonel Sidney Burbank's brigade of U.S. Regular Infantry took the front line. Brigadier General Romeyn B. Ayres' brigade backed it up. Colonel Patrick H. O'Rorke formed the reserve line. Burbank deployed the 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S. and 6<sup>th</sup> U.S. Infantry Regiments to the right of the Turnpike. The 7<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, and 11<sup>th</sup> U.S. formed on the left of the road. The 17<sup>th</sup> U.S. hustled ahead as skirmishers. Lieutenant Malbone F. Watson's Battery I, 5<sup>th</sup> U.S. Artillery unlimbered "astride the turnpike...from the crest of the valley," and shelled the Confederates across "Mott's Run meadow." Combat artist Alfred R. Waud sketched the cannon in action. He originally titled his work, "Victorious Advance of Genl. Sykes (Regulars) May 1<sup>st</sup>," but after the battle, his editors at *Harper's Weekly* prudently re-captioned it, "Splendid Advance of Sykes's Regulars."<sup>14</sup>

Soon after his arrival, Colonel Burbank advanced his brigade down the open slope to Mott's Run. "Finding the brigade was much exposed in that position, being on the side of the hill," Burbank complained that the Southern artillery fire vexed his soldiers. He resolved to "advance to the bottom of the hill to a fence bordering a small stream which ran along our front." His right, moving through the cover of timber, tried to keep pace. W. A. Sanderson, of the 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S. Infantry, wrote: "We finally come to a halt near a depression in the ground where there was a small brook, and on beyond was higher ground and some open fields, the road tending along in nearly a vertical line to ours." He also recalled: "On the higher ground and in the edge of the timber beyond the rebels made a stand." Major George L. Andrews, in charge of the skirmishers from the

17<sup>th</sup> U.S. Infantry, surged ahead, but reported difficulty crossing “the marshy ground” along Mott’s Run. He characterized the area as covered with “the dense growth of vines and underbrush” on the south side of the Turnpike. Burbank halted his brigade briefly to dress ranks behind the fence. Once set, Andrews advanced his 17<sup>th</sup> U.S. skirmishers—310 men strong—at a run. They splashed across the stream and scam-



*Union troops under Colonel Burbank attack General Mabone’s Confederates.*

pered up the far slope toward Reuben McGee’s farm. Heavy woods on the south side of the Turnpike masked Andrews’ right. The Confederates, seeing their position turned, immediately fled toward their main line. The Federals followed closely, capturing a number of prisoners, and the mile wide valley soon was cleared of Rebels once again. Burbank crossed the stream in strength, dressed ranks, and climbed the eastern slope behind his driving skirmishers.<sup>15</sup>

The 17<sup>th</sup> U.S. had pressed the 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia back from the Reuben McGee farm, sending the Confederates reeling in retreat. Moments be-

fore, Westwood A. Todd, of the 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia, had reached the McGee farm, though winded from chasing Union cavalry. "Presently we emerged from the woods into a large field where we soon dispersed the Cavalry and came upon their Infantry skirmishers in beautiful line." Another 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia soldier recalled: "On the front of our regiment was a little farm enclosed by a cedar brush fence, with a few fruit trees of perhaps five years' growth, mostly apples, in the centre of this little farm." The Southerners boldly entered the field, intensely focused on the retreating Union horse soldiers, but the Confederate brigade had not ventured beyond McGee's farm when they met Union infantry storming into the clearing.<sup>16</sup>

Mahone's 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia Infantry attempted to hold the McGee farm, but their line quickly folded. Northerners captured twenty-seven men who had taken cover around the house, surrounding them before the Rebels knew they were in danger. "The enemy was advancing," wrote one of the Southerners. "A small log house was near, and we made for that, and stood behind the gable end of it and began firing, looking directly in front." Shortly afterward, he and his comrades "were in the act of capping our guns," when someone behind them demanded their surrender. "We cast our eyes the other way, to the left, and found [a]...solid column on our left and rear." The discouraged Southron concluded: "Of course we gave up." It appears that the 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia held the Union troops north of the Turnpike in check, but did not spot the Northerners in the dense briars south of the road until it was too late. The rest of the 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia hastily retreated back to ground held by Mahone's Brigade.<sup>17</sup>

On the eastern side of the Mott's Run valley, the Confederates established their main battle line. General Lafayette McLaws formed his brigades straddling the Turnpike. Mahone held the ground north of the road, his left anchored on the highway. Brigadier Generals William Wofford and Edward A. Perry, of Anderson's division, extended Mahone's right to cover Mine Road. Captain Tyler C. Jordan's battery of guns, the Bedford (Virginia) Artillery, soon arrived on the Turnpike. McLaws kept his men on high ground, not only to cover Mine Road, but also to observe the Federals coming out of Chancellorsville. The general dutifully reported to Stonewall Jackson "that the enemy were in force in my immediate front, and were advancing, and that a large force could be seen along the heights about 1 mile or more to the rear." He had spotted Sykes' U.S. Regulars entering the Mott's Run valley. McLaws later claimed to have informed Stonewall Jackson that "the country was favorable for a flank attack from his side." Jackson accordingly instructed McLaws to take a defensive position, and he would use "his artillery, and if that did not answer he would endeavor to gain the

rear of the enemy.” From the point of McLaws’ dispatch, Stonewall Jackson appeared to be focused on getting into the Union rear—first penetrating behind Sykes’ column—and when Federals appeared on the Plank Road—penetrating behind them as well.<sup>18</sup>

Once Burbank had secured the ground around Reuben McGee’s house, Sykes ordered him to “advance to some houses bordering on the road.” The Wilderness was sparsely settled in 1863, and the open ground around the Alsop, Leitch, and Lewis farms appeared vital for a maneuvering army surrounded by woods. The Union brigade pressed up the Turnpike. En route, Sykes modified Burbank’s orders to “advance to the crest of the hill.” Everett C. Slater, of the 7<sup>th</sup> U.S. Infantry, recalled how they advanced:

[W]e gained two hills...the skirmishers of the enemy securely posted behind fences and houses sent a murderous fire in our ranks...our little band advances, another fence is gained, the shelling becomes terrible, dead and wounded cover the fields...forward in double quick, nothing can resist the impetuous charge, the Rebels give away—the heights are ours; we are in temporary security behind a hedge fence. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade has accomplished its task to take the heights we hold.<sup>19</sup>


Slater detailed that the Federals crossed “two hills” and a “heights.” This description seems subtly borne out by Alfred R. Waud’s sketch of the Union battery firing on the Turnpike. Shadowed areas of the picture are strategically placed where the Reuben McGee and Ann Lewis’ farms

*Major General Sykes’ division advancing eastward on the Orange Turnpike, May 1st 1863 in this Alfred Waud sketch (courtesy of the National Park Service).*



sat on ridges. The artist even bends the road near the Lewis farm to denote a change in elevation. These are the two “hills.” The “heights” are the top of the Mott’s Run valley — the rise by the Leitch farm. The Federals advanced up the ridge at noon. Momentum drove the 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia Infantry ahead of them to the crest of the next ridge and the Confederates rejoined Mahone’s command at Mrs. Lewis’. Burbank had won the ground with hard combat. The Union brigade commander reported that his advance “was stubbornly opposed by the enemy.” Major General George G. Meade called it “a spirited engagement,” and Colonel Thomas Devin said it was “a sharp engagement.” Some Confederates clung to the cover of a house just shy of the eastern crest of the Mott’s Run valley, which probably was the Leitch house. A 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia soldier wrote: “[W]e came to a small hut on the north side of the road having a broad chimney extending nearly across the end of the house next to us.” They discovered an “old colored woman” hiding there. She was justifiably, “frightened about out of her wits at the prospect of the impending collision.” She pointed with “wild gesticulations” at the Yankees, and begged the Confederates: “Oh, for god’s sake, don’t go *up there!* Don’t go up there!!” There are thousands of them up there and they will kill every one of you all!” Some of the Southern soldiers replied: “Never mind, old lady, we’ve got plenty of men just behind us to take care of those Yankees. Don’t be alarmed.” Their words probably offered little consolation.<sup>20</sup>

Eventually, the Federals cleared the Leitch house, and seized the heights under fire. Captain Stephen W. Weed, of the Union artillery, noted how “the division had carried the crest of a hill.” Federal Major George Andrews spoke of it as “a commanding hill.” Union attackers spilled over the summit and met the Confederate defenders drawn up a few hundred yards away. Charles E. DeNoon, of the 41<sup>st</sup> Virginia, recalled: “They (the enemy) advanced toward us as bold as lions, halted about 3 hundred yds. Dressed the line and advanced again. We reserved our fire until they came within two hundred yds. of us.” By this time, the 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia had “reached a rail fence, which ran along a slight ridge on which were a few stunted oaks,” and rejoined Mahone’s Brigade. When the Federals boiled over the crest, the Southerners “poured into the enemy a hot fire which made them break and run.” Beside Mahone’s Brigade, Brigadier General Paul Semmes’ Georgia brigade added its fire from south of the Turnpike, even though it suffered “a scattering fire from the enemy’s infantry and artillery.” Semmes reported that he “advanced a short distance, and halted in the edge of a wood overlooking open fields in which the enemy was formed.” Most of Semmes’ Brigade had a clear field of fire, but the 10<sup>th</sup> Georgia — on the far left — “were in a perfect jungle of rank vines and undergrowth.” The



*Major General Sykes presses the attack against Confederate forces under Major General McLaws.*

only way they knew the Federals were approaching was the “birds and animals frightened by Sykes’ men...came close up to our lines or flew over us.”<sup>21</sup>

The Union attackers stormed past the Ann Lewis farm, and spotted the Confederates on the next rise to the east — just beyond the Leitch house. James H. Leitch, son of the farm owner, declared: “On the first day of the Chancellorsville fight...[our] farm was between our and the enemy’s lines of battle. The Yankees coming up on one side of the farm about ten o’clock in the morning of the day before the fight and remained till three o’clock next day, when they were driven back by the Confederates.” Leitch’s account conclusively delineates where the battle lines had been drawn, and also helps identify the ridge seized by the Federals (between Leitch and Lewis) and the slight ridge held by Mahone’s Brigade (between Leitch and Alsop). This testimony is perhaps the single most important piece of evidence for placing the happen-

ings on May 1, 1863 on the Orange Turnpike. The Federals swarmed to within 75 yards of this Confederate line.<sup>22</sup>

At first, Mahone's line appeared to be thrown into disorder. By some mistake, Mahone's ambulances and ordnance trains had followed the brigade to the front. They soon came under "the full fire of the enemy." A watching Rebel wrote: "A stampede followed, each teamster whipping furiously into the woods with sublime disregard of getting out again." Wheels locked against trees and became stuck fast, amid a whirlwind of shells bursting "fast and furiously" around them. One Confederate remembered seeing a shell strike an ambulance "midships." It "tore off all the rear parts of the vehicle and left the driver perched on two wheels, himself and animals unhurt."<sup>23</sup>

The Confederates recovered their poise and unleashed a crushing fire that repulsed the Federal attack. One of Mahone's officers recounted: "The air is filled with shrieking bullets and screaming shells, and the volumes of smoke make midnight of midday." The Northerners gathered and regrouped behind the summit of the ridge. Confederate General Paul Semmes reported: "The enemy, after a sharp contest, retired a short distance, and took shelter under a crest." Captain Jonathan B. Hager, 14<sup>th</sup> U.S. Infantry, wrote substantially the same thing: "Under a fire from the enemy's battery in front, the line advanced to the crest of the hill, and took its position under the crest." Some of Burbank's units lagged behind others. On the right, W. A. Sanderson, of the 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S. Infantry, remembered, "the gradual ascent in the open.... We had not yet reached the highest ground in our front, so were ordered to lie down." The Union soldier reflected gratefully: "The rise in the ground partially protected me from the withering fire." Confederate artilleryist, Captain Tyler Jordan, whose battery centered the Southern line on the Turnpike, remembered: "After gaining the cover of the hill, they [the Federals] did not advance; but sent a cloud of sharpshooters over the hill."<sup>24</sup>


Burbank's brigade huddled on a shelf just behind the ridge, and waited for support. Sykes hurried forward reinforcements and artillery. General Romeyn B. Ayres' brigade of U.S. Regulars rushed across Mott's Run to cover Burbank's left flank while Watson's Battery I, 5<sup>th</sup> U.S. Artillery, galloped into the yard of the Lewis farm. O'Rorke's brigade closed in support. The Federals launched several sorties over the ridge, but the Confederates repulsed them with significant losses. Major William Stewart, of the 61<sup>st</sup> Virginia Infantry, recounted: "The fight rages with the fury of maddened and determined opponents for long hours...." The 7<sup>th</sup> U.S. Infantry lost its color bearer, who "was shot down" leading a charge. Corporal Stephen O'Neill "took up the colors from the color bearer who had been shot down and bore them through the remainder of the battle." O'Neill earned the Congressional Medal of

Honor for his actions that day. A bullet winged Major George Andrews, commander of the 17<sup>th</sup> U.S. Infantry, and another grazed his horse. On the other side, the leader of the 51<sup>st</sup> Georgia Infantry, Colonel William M. Slaughter, “received his death wound early in the action.” Adjutant Frederick H. West ran to the colonel’s side. “I raised him up,” West wrote: “His right arm was torn off at the elbow and the right leg shattered about the knee. The shock was terrible and his agony intense.” Colonel Slaughter whispered to the adjutant: “They have got me, Fred; I am gone.” West held his dying commander, “and for the first time in years tears ran down my face.” Slaughter’s replacement, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ball, also fell after receiving “a wound in the head, which disabled him.” In Mahone’s Brigade, Major Stewart, of the 61<sup>st</sup> Virginia, fell, “bruised by a piece of shell.”<sup>25</sup>

Watson’s Union artillery moved cautiously forward until it “crowned the crest.” Jordan’s Southern artillery dueled with these Union guns at the short interval of 500 yards. Both sides took heavy losses. Captain John D. Wilkins, of the 3<sup>rd</sup> U.S. Infantry, recalled: “As to the fight, it is hard to tell who had the advantage in the fighting but we have given them the severest fight this army has seen.” Confederate artillery commander, Colonel Edward Porter Alexander, reported: “Captain Jordan was engaged very obstinately on the turnpike, and suffered in both men and horses.” In comparison, Alexander wrote of his other cannon: “On the Plank Road the rest of the battalion was slightly engaged.” Jordan trained his full effort on Watson’s guns with some surprising consequences. Jordan noted that, “a battery took a position in rear of a farm house not more than 500 yards in our front. We opened on this battery at once, but at the first fire, I discovered that the house was inhabited.” A woman and several small children bolted from the dwelling. Jordan observed them “running around it, in great fright.” The Rebel artillerist had struck the Ann Lewis homestead, and he quickly looked for a better angle to get at Watson’s Union guns. In the end, Watson’s battery lost a limber—an ammunition chest on wheels—blown up, and Jordan admitted that his battery had been “pretty badly cut up, and that night [was] ordered back to refit.”<sup>26</sup>

General Sykes perceived that the Confederate front appeared to be expanding. He reported the Rebel forces as “so superior to my own,” that they “outflanked me both right and left.” He tried to communicate with the Federal columns on the Plank Road and the River Road, but had no success. A small detachment of Pennsylvania cavalry ventured to the left to connect with Meade’s column on the River Road, but failed to make contact. Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren, Hooker’s topographical engineer, sent an aide to find Major General Henry W. Slocum’s Twelfth Corps on the right. The aide blundered into enemy

skirmishers, and narrowly escaped capture. A similar attempt by one of the division's staff officers was foiled in the same way. Sykes reported his isolated situation directly to Hooker at Chancellorsville. Heavily disputed in front, with Confederates breaking his contact with units to his right and left. Sykes looked to Hooker to reinforce him on the Turnpike. Warren volunteered to see Hooker personally. Assuming the Union army commander still intended to push toward the Zoan Church ridge,



*Confederates form on Sykes' right flank and press back the Union advance.*

Sykes clung to the shelf behind the ridge and waited for fresh troops to arrive. He recounted: "I threw the First Brigade (Regulars) under General Ayres, rapidly to the left... Colonel Burbank held the front. The battery checked any advance by the main road... both of these flanks rested on a dense growth of forest." The division commander knew he had gained valuable ground, and he emphasized to his subordinates that they must "hold it at all hazards" until help arrived.<sup>27</sup>

Across the field, Lafayette McLaws found reinforcements more readily available. He bolstered his line, and prepared to hold his ground

until Jackson could strike the Union right flank. McLaws planted Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw's South Carolina brigade south of the highway to support Semmes' Brigade. The South Carolinians formed a second line behind the Georgians. Around this time, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Virginia Cavalry relayed a troubling message to McLaws. Troopers reported that "the enemy were advancing along the Mine road," which led to the Confederate right flank and rear. The cavalry in gray had spied Meade's two Fifth Corps divisions on the River Road. The Confederates had not considered an advance coming from that direction. As a result, there were no troops in place to thwart the Federals' progress, which posed a real threat to McLaws' right flank. Instead of extending his left to connect with Stonewall Jackson, McLaws responded by bending back Wofford's and Perry's brigades to cover the Mine Road and the road to Duerson's Mill. Later, Brigadier General Cadmus M. Wilcox's Brigade came forward to support Perry's right, and cover the Duerson's Mill road. Fortunately for McLaws, Meade was unaware of Sykes' predicament, or that his column was on the Confederate flank. Before the opportunity became evident, other events would deny General Meade a chance to break the impasse on the Turnpike.<sup>28</sup>

George Sykes grew increasingly concerned as the Confederates extended beyond both of his flanks, and threatened to cut his line of retreat. The Federal commander deployed his last brigade—his only available reserves—to protect his flanks. Patrick O'Rourke's brigade, composed of three New York regiments, had rested behind the Lewis farm in support of Watson's U.S. artillery. The brigade had originally "filed left, out of the road and into a cornfield," directly behind the blazing Union guns. Sykes sensed a buildup of strength on McLaws' right, though, and detached the 5<sup>th</sup> New York Infantry from O'Rourke to guard his left. The New York brigade commander reported that the 5<sup>th</sup> New York "deployed as skirmishers through the woods on the left of the division." The New Yorkers, tested veterans of Gaines' Mill and Second Manassas, however, went sullenly into the forest. Their term of service was due to expire in a couple of days, and none of them relished combat on the eve of going home. As their luck would have it, the Confederates on that end of the line were too preoccupied with Meade's threat to their flank to worry the New Yorkers. The 5<sup>th</sup> New York settled into position and did not press the Rebels further.<sup>29</sup>

On the other end of the line, Confederates continued to menace the Union right flank. Paul Semmes advanced a "strong line of skirmishers from the Tenth Georgia...far forward," to harass the Federals positioned in the woods south of the Turnpike. The 10<sup>th</sup> Georgia detachment crashed through the forest, and deployed close to the end of the Union line. There, they vexed the Union troops with an enfilading fire, which,

in Semmes' judgment, "contributed materially to the repulse of the enemy's lines." The 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S. Infantry found its hands full with fire from the front, as well as on their flank. Sykes accordingly sent the 146<sup>th</sup> New York Infantry to its assistance. These New Yorkers, unlike the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment, had never been in combat before. Six companies of green troops, under the command of Colonel Kenner Garrard, moved south of the road and into the woods. The regimental historian chronicled: "The detachment from our regiment moved out on the double-quick, spreading out as skirmishers and meeting the enemy's fire from behind trees, rocks, and fences." The New Yorkers wrote that they had been drawn to that point by "a suspicious and unexpected fire from the right of the line...." With Confederates testing his right and left, Sykes summed up his predicament: "In this situation, without support, my position was critical; still, I determined to hold it as long as possible."<sup>50</sup>

Unknown to Sykes, the 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S. and 146<sup>th</sup> New York Regiments had encountered more than a nuisance detachment of the 10<sup>th</sup> Georgia. Captain Samuel A. McKee, of the 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S., recalled that, "it was found necessary to advance a platoon of skirmishers from the battalion to the front and right, as the enemy were moving to the right and rear of our brigade, their skirmishers advancing at a brisk walk." Another member of the 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S. recorded: "The rebel troops who opened fire on the Second Brigade, of which the Second Infantry held the right, was McLaws' Division, supported by the Divisions of Anderson and Rodes." McLaws held the front on the Orange Turnpike with elements of Anderson's division, but Major General Robert E. Rodes commanded a division in Jackson's Corps on the Orange Plank Road. Rodes had marched in the wake of Stonewall's advance on the Plank Road, and then wheeled north to threaten Sykes' flank and rear. Two of Jackson's staff officers, Jedediah Hotchkiss and William Allan, explained: "Jackson having been notified of the advanced position of the Federal troops on the Old Turnpike, pushed forward his troops on the Plank Road, and between the two roads, and threatened Sykes' flank." The mention of troops "*between the two roads*" is important to understanding what happened next to the 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S. and 146<sup>th</sup> New York Regiments. William F. Pendleton, 50<sup>th</sup> Georgia Infantry, spotted Rodes' troops from his position on Semmes' battle line. He wrote: "In the field nearby our men saw Jackson's men charge and fire and the enemy retreat." Jackson's thrust up the Plank Road had not encountered any Federals until it ran into Slocum's Twelfth Corps near the John R. Alrich farm. As a result, Stonewall had well outstripped McLaws' line. Semmes' Georgians could not see any of Jackson's men except those who came toward them — namely, Rodes' division.<sup>51</sup>


The 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S. reacted to Rodes' advance by wheeling its line back to

face south. The U.S. Regulars retarded the Confederate movement briefly, "stopping their progress for a time," but they could not halt the attackers completely. The action became spirited and costly. Captain Salem S. Marsh, commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S. Infantry, tried to steady his men under increasing pressure. He rode up and down the line with his sword aloft, crying: "Steady there, boys; don't run!" He galloped beyond his refused right to learn more about the Rebels penetrating his rear. A few paces from his lines a sharpshooter brought him down with a bullet in the forehead. Suspecting the Confederates were deliberately targeting leaders, the Regular officers tore off their shoulder straps and other insignia, and advised the arriving 146<sup>th</sup> New York Infantry to do the same.<sup>52</sup>

The 146<sup>th</sup> New York arrived just in time to join in "a desperate and exciting conflict." The regimental historian recalled that, "they found the enemy in the woods just across some open fields and were exchanging shots with them as fast as they could load and fire." Realizing that overwhelming forces were slicing toward his right rear, General Sykes decided he had no choice but to withdraw to safer ground. Almost at the same moment, General Warren returned with Joseph Hooker's orders for Sykes' entire division to retreat. The ridge around Mrs. Lewis' farm had become untenable for Sykes' small division, but Hooker jumped to the conclusion that all of his advance troops held indefensible positions on the widely divergent roads radiating out of Chancellorsville. The only way to achieve mutual support, according to Hooker's hasty calculations, required pulling all of his advance elements back to Chancellorsville. The army commander's messengers sped away to bring back Sykes as well as Meade and Slocum's columns. Sykes' troops received the retreat order with anger and disbelief. "Then there was heard cursing and grumbling from the Regulars," recalled a veteran, "not at being ordered into danger, but at being ordered out. All knew too well that again somebody had blundered." The bluecoat soldiers started their retreat reluctantly, "soon after 1:30 p.m." General Lafayette McLaws, unaware of Hooker's latest orders, attributed the retrograde movement to "General Jackson's artillery and his advance, in conjunction with the failure of the attack in my front, [which] forced the enemy to retire."<sup>53</sup>

George Sykes passed Hooker's order down the line, as he prepared to extract his division from the Mott's Run valley. "My brigades," the general recorded, "covered by skirmishers, moved in succession, in line of battle, to the height on which McGee's house rests." This dwelling was the home of Absalom McGee, on the west side of Mott's Run. Colonel Sidney Burbank stated that his brigade "was accordingly withdrawn slowly in line of battle and in good order, occasionally facing about and fronting the enemy." Many Union soldiers thought Hooker retreated

prematurely, but others believed the withdrawal order came too late, as problems continued to plague Sykes' right. W. A. Sanderson, of the 2<sup>nd</sup> U.S., wrote: "As we arrived at the foot of the incline again near the little brook the line seemed somewhat broken by some being to[o] anxious to get to the rear." A Regular noted that many bluecoats "were hit while



*Union forces fall back toward the Chancellorsville intersection as Confederates continue to press their attack.*

falling back."<sup>54</sup>

The 146<sup>th</sup> New York Infantry also suffered numerous difficulties while escaping the Confederate advance. O'Rorke recalled the six companies south of the Turnpike, but only four of them heard the order and responded. The other two companies continued to battle Rodes' troops in the woods. When they realized what had happened, Companies G and A independently tried to escape the closing trap. Company G made some progress, while in the brush, but ran out of luck when it entered a clearing near the Turnpike. One New Yorker remembered that the company "was crossing a cornfield when it was surrounded and commanded

to halt and surrender.” Captain Isaac P. Powell “rallied his men as well as he could and they furiously attacked the Confederates, fighting them hand to hand and running in the direction the main body of the regiment had taken.” The chronicler noted: “The Captain and the greater part of his men were able to fight their way through to the Union lines.” Company A, however, never made it back. Confederates converged on the Unionists as they tried to climb over a fence. “Only a few members of Company ‘A’ escaped.” Some of the men in the 5<sup>th</sup> New York who were near the end of their enlistments suffered a similar fate. “Some of these skirmishers,” Colonel Patrick O’Rorke recounted, “were captured by the enemy.” Even those lucky enough to escape, often did so at the expense of their gear and personal property. Confederates marveled at how the Yankees littered their retreat route with “a good proportion of their belongings, which they had dropped in their hurried retreat....” One Southerner remembered how the “roads and fields were lined with guns and knapsacks of the enemy.”<sup>55</sup>

Confederate artillery also hounded the Union retreat, and even shelled a Union hospital located on the far side of the Mott’s Run valley, at the Newton house. Surgeon John S. Billings recalled: “I stopped behind a little frame house, giving notice to bring the wounded there.... At first the men that were most severely hit were brought back by members of the band.” But the Union band members soon opted to drag their wounded charges farther to the rear for safety. “When the men began to bring their wounded fellow soldiers in,” Billings recounted, “they would not stop where I was. Finally a shell went through this wooden shanty, making a deuce of a clatter, and that settled the question of the men stopping.” The surgeon relocated his hospital 200-300 yards farther west, at the Absalom McGee house. The Confederates shelled the hospital area not only to disrupt Sykes’ retreat, but also to discourage a signal station, “established in a tree about a mile and half east of Chancellorsville, in the vicinity of Newton.” Another reason Newton’s farm came under shellfire was the arrival of Major General Winfield Scott Hancock’s division of the Union Second Corps. Hancock’s men met Sykes at the crest of the ridge, where they prepared to cover the Federal retreat and deter the Confederates from following too closely. The house on the ridge top provided a useful target for Southern cannon to concentrate their fire. After Sykes passed to the rear, Hancock’s division also withdrew into the defensive cordon around Chancellorsville.<sup>56</sup>

McLaws hesitated in his immediate pursuit. Part of his decision stemmed from additional reports of the Federal presence on the Mine Road, to the north, where the 3<sup>rd</sup> Virginia Cavalry had brushed against Brigadier General Charles Griffin’s Union division. Griffin had marched on the River Road to the vicinity of the Decker farm, overlooking

Banks' Ford, when he received Hooker's order to pull back to Chancellorsville. Fifth Corps commander, General George Meade reported on what happened after the advancing column turned around: "General Griffin was halted on his return march, owing to the advance of the enemy on the withdrawal of Sykes." Griffin attempted to form a line of battle to the left of Hancock's division, but failed to make contact with the Second Corps troops.<sup>57</sup>

Lafayette McLaws advanced William Wofford's and Edward Perry's brigades, "to scour the country between us and the river." These Southern troops located Griffin about the same time the Federals spotted them. Union Brigadier General James Barnes wrote that his brigade, "when returning, was directed to be formed in line of battle in the woods...which was soon done. Pickets were thrown to the front and abatis hastily made, for the protection of the line." The pickets provoked an angry exchange that escalated with the introduction of artillery into the fray. Barnes confessed that his position was "undesirable" because it was "exposed to the fire of the enemy."<sup>58</sup>

On the other hand, Florida troops in Perry's Brigade, thought the Union artillery with Barnes did incredible damage. They particularly noted the effect on the Jett farmstead. Joel C. Blake, of the 5<sup>th</sup> Florida Infantry, recalled:

We passed a little dwelling they had fired in their retreat and it was distressing to hear the cries of the inmates, the elderly lady of the house had been shot in to [in two], her head severed from her body. A younger woman, seemingly her daughter, was perfectly frantic and in her fright had run off and lost her two little children. We passed on and left them, but I tell you the blood boiled in every man.<sup>59</sup>

The action to the north eventually stabilized and, by 4:00 p.m., Stonewall Jackson had ordered McLaws to pursue the Federals retreating on the Turnpike. The Confederates advanced without much opposition, crossing Mott's Run and bivouacking "on McGee's hill to the left of the turnpike, near Chancellorsville, close to a road leading down to the left to an iron furnace." McLaws took position on the ridge by Newton's and Absalom McGee's. The road to the iron furnace led to Catharine's Furnace. A quick Confederate thrust into the swampy forests ahead, led to a sharp and costly rebuff. The Rebels advanced with "yells more infernal than human" that abruptly ended with a heavy fusillade from O'Rorke's tired New Yorkers. A U.S. Regular noted an irate Union chaplain incongruously screaming at his men: "Give 'em Hell, boys; give 'em Hell, and the Lord have mercy on their souls." The Confederates retreated up the ridge to the furnace road, and settled in for the night. Action drifted into a fitful quiet as night inked out the Wilderness land-

scape.<sup>40</sup>

Limited action had occurred on River Road and the Orange Plank Road. The principle area of combat, however, unfolded between George Sykes and Lafayette McLaws, on the Orange Turnpike. The Federals suffered two hundred and sixty-one casualties in the fighting there. The assistant surgeon of the 7<sup>th</sup> U.S. Infantry recorded that his regiment “went into action with twenty-one officers and 310 men.” His unit lost 29 of them, amounting to almost ten percent of the force engaged. The Confederates also suffered significant losses. John F. Sale, of the 12<sup>th</sup> Virginia, tallied his regiment’s casualties “during the fight here” as “93 killed wounded and missing — about ¼ of our entire number.” The 51<sup>st</sup> Georgia, in Semmes’ Brigade, lost “at least 100 men — more than the rest of Semmes’ brigade that day,” including two commanders. Overall, Sykes had taken the heaviest toll of Union losses for the day. Confederate casualties are uncertain, but believed to be equivalent to Federal losses. As night fell and soldiers comforted the wounded and buried the dead, two monumental figures plotted the next day’s battle by firelight. Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson sensed that an opportunity had presented itself to destroy Hooker’s Army of the Potomac.<sup>41</sup>

The sudden encounter on the Orange Turnpike by the Lewis, Leitch, and Alsop farms proved to be the first shots in the momentous Battle of Chancellorsville. Lee’s willingness to take great risks confused his adversary, Joseph Hooker. Preeminent Chancellorsville historian, John Bigelow, wrote of the action: “As Hooker outwitted Lee by massing his right wing at Chancellorsville, so Lee outwitted Hooker by concentrating at Zion [Zoan] Church. The first point in the game was made yesterday by Hooker; the second, which, as we shall see, neutralized the first, was made to-day by Lee.” A Union staff officer reflected later: “The advance stopped. The battle of Chancellorsville was lost right there.” Lee had forced the Federals back into the heart of the Wilderness, a nightmare region that prohibited Hooker from bringing his larger force to bear on the smaller Confederate army. The most critical element of Robert E. Lee’s success at Chancellorsville, however, came from stealing the initiative away from Hooker. The aggressive stand on the Turnpike on May 1, 1863 provided the impetus and opportunity for Lee to press an offensive and attain victory. Writing of Lee, a Georgian in Semmes’ Brigade reflected: “He fights so fast when he gets the enemy where he wants them that they never recover....” At the end of May 1 — thanks largely to the obstinate Confederate stand on the Orange Turnpike — Robert E. Lee had Joseph Hooker right where he wanted him.<sup>42</sup>

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- <sup>1</sup> William E. Cameron, "Chancellorsville", in George S. Bernard, *War Talks of Confederate Veterans* (Petersburg: Fenn & Owen, 1892) 49-50; John F. Sale, May 15, 1863 letter, Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park (hereafter cited FRSP).
- <sup>2</sup> "J.R.," *Rochester Union and Advertiser*, May 9, 1863; Reuben Kelly, June 1, 1863 letter, FRSP.
- <sup>3</sup> Charles E. DeNoon, May 7, 1863 letter, in Richard T. Couture, *Charlie's Letters* (n.p., n.d.) 140; John C. Wallace, diary, FRSP; *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: General Printing Office, 1880-1901), Vol. 25, pt. 1, 780-1 (hereafter cited as *OR*—all references are in Series I, Vol. 25, pt. 1).
- <sup>4</sup> Stephen W. Sears, *Chancellorsville* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996) 203-204.
- <sup>5</sup> Cameron, "Chancellorsville," 51; Sale, May 15, 1863 letter, FRSP; Lafayette McLaws, April 29, 1863 letter, in *A Soldier's General*, ed. by John C. Oeffinger (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) 179; *OR*, 833; Frederick H. West, May 5, 1863 letter, in *Atlanta Southern Confederacy*, May 19, 1863.
- <sup>6</sup> Cameron, "Chancellorsville," 51; *OR*, 825.
- <sup>7</sup> *OR*, 507; John Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910) 240.
- <sup>8</sup> *Atlanta The Sunny South*, July 27, 1890; David G. McIntosh, "A Ride on Horseback in the Summer of 1910," Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.
- <sup>9</sup> George S. Bernard, *War Talks of Confederate Veterans*, 69; Bigelow, *Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 245; Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943) II, 532; Jedediah Hotchkiss and William Allen, *The Battle-fields of Virginia: Chancellorsville* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1867) 36.
- <sup>10</sup> Charles I. Wickersham, "Personal Recollections of the Cavalry at Chancellorsville," *Papers Read Before the Commander of the State of Wisconsin, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States*, III, 456-7; Stephen W. Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 204.
- <sup>11</sup> Bernard, *War Talks of Confederate Veterans*, 69.
- <sup>12</sup> Wickersham, "Personal Recollections of the Cavalry at Chancellorsville," 457; *Atlanta The Sunny South*, July 27, 1890; *OR*, 781; LeRoy S. Edwards, May 10, 1863 letter,

Randolph Macon College.

- <sup>15</sup> Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 204; John G. Wallace, diary, FRSP.
- <sup>14</sup> Atlanta *The Sunny South*, July 27, 1890; *OR*, 533; Timothy J. Reese, *Sykes' Regular Infantry Division*, 213; *Harper's Weekly*, May 23, 1863.
- <sup>15</sup> *OR*, 533, 540; *National Tribune*, Jan. 11, 1894; Reese, *Sykes' Regular Infantry Division 1861-1864* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, Inc., 1990) 210-212.
- <sup>16</sup> Westwood A. Todd, reminiscence, in *Voices of the Civil War: Chancellorsville*, ed. by Henry Woodhead (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, Inc., 1996) 58; "Recollections of a Brave Fighter," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, July 24, 1907; Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 205.
- <sup>17</sup> "Recollections of a Brave Fighter," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, July 24, 1907.
- <sup>18</sup> *OR*, 825; Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 205.
- <sup>19</sup> Everett C. Slater, May 8, 1863 letter, FRSP.
- <sup>20</sup> Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 205; Bigelow, *Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 246; Bernard, *War Talks of Confederate Veterans*, 69.
- <sup>21</sup> *OR*, 513, 540, 833; Charles E. DeNoon, May 7, 1863 letter, in *Charlie's Letters*, 140; Todd, in *Voices of the Civil War: Chancellorsville*, 58; *Atlanta Journal*, Aug. 31, 1901.
- <sup>22</sup> John B. Leitch, affidavits, Confederate Papers Related to Citizens or Business Firms, Record Group 109, M-346, National Archives.
- <sup>23</sup> Cameron, "Chancellorsville," 52.
- <sup>24</sup> *OR*, 532, 833-4; Atlanta *The Sunny South*, July 27, 1890; *National Tribune*, Jan. 11, 1894; Joseph A. Graves, *The History of the Bedford Light Artillery* (Bedford, Va.: Press of the Bedford Democrat, 1903) 29.
- <sup>25</sup> Atlanta *The Sunny South*, July 27, 1890; Frederick H. West, May 5, 1863 letter, in *Atlanta Southern Confederacy*, May 19, 1863; Reese, *Sykes' Regular Infantry Division*, 210-212; *OR*, 536-7, 834.
- <sup>26</sup> *OR*, 525, 821; Graves, *The History of the Bedford Light Artillery*, 29.
- <sup>27</sup> *OR*, 525, 533; Bigelow, *Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 247.
- <sup>28</sup> *OR*, 825, 830.
- <sup>29</sup> J. Ansel Booth, May 9, 1863 letter, FRSP; *OR*, 541.
- <sup>30</sup> *OR*, 525, 834; Mary Genevieve Green Brainard, *Campaigns of the One Hundred and Forty-sixth Regiment New York State Volunteers* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915) 74-5.

- <sup>31</sup> *OR*, 534; Reese, *Sykes' Regular Infantry Division*, 212; Jedediah Hotchkiss and William Allan, *The Battle-Fields of Virginia: Chancellorsville*, 37; William F. Pendleton, *Confederate Memoirs: Early Life and Family History of William Frederic Pendleton*, ed. by Constance Pendleton (Bryn Athyn, Pa.: n.p., 1958) 31.
- <sup>32</sup> *OR*, 534; *National Tribune*, Jan. 11, 1894; Brainard, *Campaigns of the One Hundred and Forty-sixth New York Volunteers*, 74.
- <sup>33</sup> Brainard, *Campaigns of the One Hundred and Forty-sixth New York Volunteers*, 75; Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 213; Reese, *Sykes' Regular Infantry Division*, 215; *OR*, 825.
- <sup>34</sup> *OR*, 525-6, 533; *National Tribune*, Jan. 11, 1894.
- <sup>35</sup> Brainard, *Campaigns of the One Hundred and Forty-sixth New York Volunteers*, 75-7; William F. Pendleton, *Confederate Memoirs*, 31.
- <sup>36</sup> Fielding H. Garrison, *John Shaw Billings* (New York: n.p., 1915) 41; *OR*, 541; Bigelow, *Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 242, 250; Theodore A. Dodge, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville* (Boston: Ticknor, 1881) 48.
- <sup>37</sup> *OR*, 507.
- <sup>38</sup> Tallahassee *Floridian and Journal*, n.d., copy in FRSP; C. Seton Fleming, *Memoir of Capt. C. Seton Fleming* (Jacksonville, Fl.: Times-Union Publishing House, 1881) 72-3; *OR*, 515.
- <sup>39</sup> "Letters of Joel C. Blake," *Apalachee*, Vol. 5 (1962) 18-19.
- <sup>40</sup> *Atlanta Journal*, Aug. 31, 1901; Brian A. Bennett, *Sons of Old Monroe: A Regimental History of Patrick O'Rourke's 140<sup>th</sup> New York Volunteer Infantry* (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside, 1992) 163; Reese, *Sykes' Regular Infantry Division*, 215.
- <sup>41</sup> *Supplement to the Official Record of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 70 vols. (Wilmington, N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1994-2000) Vol. 5, 623; Reuben Kelly, June 1, 1863 letter, FRSP; Sale, May 4, 1863 letter, FRSP; Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 206.
- <sup>42</sup> Bigelow, *Campaign of Chancellorsville*, 206; Sears, *Chancellorsville*, 212; Frederick W. West, May 18, 1863 letter, United Daughters of the Confederacy Collection, Washington D.C.